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Learning of fixed arbitrary sequences proceeds by idiosyncratic sub- 
sequencing and assembly of the resulting subsequences. An error item that 
just precedes a subjective subsequence is a closely constrained member of 
that subsequence. Identification and characterization of subjective sub- 
sequences were accomplished by analyses of forward serial learning, free 
recall, and backward serial learning. We conclude that ordinary serial 
learning cannot be represented by traditional continuous-process theories, 
but instead must be treated by an organizational model. 
When it comes to learning a sequence of events, it is clear that subjects 
make use of organizational principles provided by the experimenter. Thus, 
for example, McLean and Gregg (1967) divided a randomly ordered 
list of 24 letters into groups and observed differential within- and be- 
tween-group interresponse times both on the criterion trial of serial recall 
learning and in attempts to recall the list backwardly. Similarly, Wilkes 
and Kennedy (1970) induced certain groupings on lists of nine letters 
and observed lengthened reading times at group boundaries, as well as 
other boundary related phenomena. Also, Lesgold and Bower (1970) 
have shown that when a serial list of letters is grouped into letter triplets, 
learning errors predominate at the position of letters that initiate a triplet. 
The foregoing results exemplify the fact that subjects respond to ex- 
perimenter-determined subdivision of otherwise arbitrary sequences in 
a serial learning task. A useful representation of such results is that events 
within a group are serially organized together under a representative 
implicit code, that these codes are themselves grouped together in some 
fashion, and so on to yield a hierarchical memory structure for the 
sequence as a whole (Johnson, 1970; Lesgold & Bower, 1970). 
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A priori organization of a sequence is not limited to experimenter- 
imposed grouping of otherwise mutually unrelated events. Simpson 
(1965), for example, controlled the serial arrangement of the same 30 
words so that from condition to condition the arrangements variously 
approximated English word order. With random orders of words no group 
boundaries were evident in the bowed serial position curve. With orders 
that closely approximated English, however, definite boundaries were 
observed, corresponding to English phrase structure. The role of natural 
language in imposing organization on sequence learning has been well- 
documented by Johnson ( 1968). Again, the sensible representation seems 
to be hierarchical in nature, in this case in terms of implicitly understood 
grammatical structure. 
The final source of sequence organization we will mention is the 
organization that derives from generative production rules. The phenom- 
enon of interest here is that when subsequences of a sequence are 
producible by applying different rules, errors accumulate at the position 
that initiates a given rule, then decline throughout the subsequence to 
which the rule applies. Restle (1970; Restle & Brown, 1970) has analyzed 
such situations thoroughly, particularly for light-location sequences and 
sequences of tones in melodies. The theoretical representation he proposes 
entails subsequences that are dominated by generative rules (ascending, 
descending, trill), where these rules in turn are hierarchically dominated 
by further rules (transposition, repetition, mirror image). A similar 
orientation has been taken by Egan ( 1973), who has demonstrated the 
power of assuming a hierarchical subgoal structure for learning to solve 
sequential problems. In this case, errors are most frequent just after a 
subgoal has been attained and decline as the subject gets closer to the 
next subgoal. 
The general picture, then, is that when subjects are faced with learning 
a sequence that is serially inhomogeneous, they divide the sequence into 
subsequences. How they do the division depends on the organizational 
principles that characterize the sequence. On the other hand, in contrast 
to the progress being made toward understanding how sequences with 
a priori structure are learned, we have the traditional topic of serial leam- 
ing wherein the sequence of events is by design as internally homogeneous 
as the experimenter can make it. Since the time of Ebbinghaus’ germinal 
monograph in 1885, most researchers have sought to remove from their 
sequences all bases for subdivision. An interesting concomitant fact is that 
the attendent theorizing about how subjects learn such sequences has 
generally presumed that intrasequence homogeneity was attained, both 
objectively and subjectively. That is, sequence construction by experi- 
menters and theoretical hypotheses by theorists have depended on the 
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notion that ordinary serial learning does not involve intralist structural 
heterogeneity (for reviews, see Ebenholtz, 1972; Osgood, 1953, pp. 502- 
520; Young, 1968). For example, Ebenholtz ( 1972) considers briefly 
Mandler’s (1967) general system for memory organization. Mandler’s 
notion is that 5 + 2 events is the basic limit of the organizing system. 
When the number of events exceeds this limit, additional groups with 
the same 5 k 2 limits are formed. Then these groups are themselves 
grouped into groups. And so on until the complete set of basic events 
is hierarchically organized. Ebenholtz, however, intent on a unitary 
dimensional account of serial learning, dismisses Mandler’s view by say- 
ing simply that “this approach cannot be effective in those cases where 
retrieval must follow a given order . . .” (p. 300). 
From a seemingly different quarter we have the well-known facts of 
subject-induced organization of free-recall lists that from the experi- 
menter’s point of view have no a priori basis for subdivision (Tulving, 
1962; Mandler, 1967). When given successive study-test trials on a list 
of unrelated events that are randomly permuted in the study phase of 
each trial, subjects evolve idiosyncratic groupings of those items, group- 
ings that persist in the recall test phase even though the study phase 
entails rearrangement. Thus we know two things: (a) Subjective orga- 
nization is a fact in tasks where the input events are scrambled from 
trial to trial. (b) Given any of a variety of apparent a priori bases of 
organization of a to-be-learned sequence, the learning progress of the 
subjects is heterogeneous through the sequence in ways identifiable with 
the organizational structure of that sequence. 
From these considerations it follows that if subjects, faced with learning 
a sequence that from the experimenter’s point of view is structurally 
homogeneous, in fact impose subjective organization on such sequences, 
then the traditional serial learning paradigm, together with all its theo- 
retical problems, can be reassigned to the domain of organizational 
theories of memory. Accordingly, the purpose of the research to be 
reported is to identify and characterize subsequences in serial learning 
and thereby to deny the presumption (e.g., Ebenholtz, 1972) that 
ordinary serial learning can be satisfactorily understood in terms of a 
continuous, homogeneous theoretical representation. 
METHOD 
Forty-eight University of Michigan undergraduates learned a fixed 
serial list of 32 common four-letter words by the self-paced anticipation 
method.” The words were printed on 4 x 6 cards. There was an initial 
‘The list of 32 words, in the order they were learned by all 48 subjects, is shown 
on the left in Figs. 1 and 2. 
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inspection trial during which the experimenter showed the subject each 
word in succession, On anticipation trials the experimenter did not show 
the subject the next word until the subject either correctly anticipated 
it, made an error, or signaled that he was stymied. Guessing was en- 
couraged. The trials were discrete events-the subjects could see how 
many cards were left in the deck as he approached the end of the list, 
and he waited while the experimenter tallied and informed him of the 
number of correct responses on that trial. This procedure continued 
until the subject correctly anticipated 21 out of the possible 32 words. 
On completion of the serial learning task to the 21-out-of-32 criterion, 
the subject was given a blank sheet of paper and asked to write down as 
many of the words from the list as he could remember, in whatever order 
he happened to think of them. Following this free recall, he was asked 
to serially anticipate the list in backward order. There was no inspection 
trial-the subject started out by trying to give the last word in the list. 
The cards were then presented as in forward serial learning, but in 
reverse order. This continued until a 21-out-of-32 criterion was met. 
The only features of our procedure of any remark are that we used the 
same list for everyone and that we allowed the subject to proceed at 
his own pace. Since we have no interest in a smooth group-average serial 
position curve, we saw no reason to scramble the list from subject to 
subject; and since we did not want to obscure subjective subsequencing, 
we decided against pacing the subjects, which results in rushing them 
early in learning and disrupting them late in learning. 
RESULTS 
Seriograms 
The basic representation of the data is in the form of what we call a 
seriogram. An example of one subject’s seriogram is shown in Fig. 1. The 
numbers on the left are the 32 serial positions. Next to each number is 
the word that occupied that position. The latticelike display of connected 
dots just to the right of the words, the display labeled SL( F), represents 
this subject’s performance in forward serial learning. A dot is a correct 
anticipation of a given word (row) on a given trial ( column). Thus the 
word at Position 6 was correctly anticipated on Trials 2 through 7, while 
its neighbors, the words at Positions 5 and 7, were never correctly 
anticipated. The word at Position 16 was correctly anticipated on Trials 
3 and 4 and on Trials 6 and 7. And so on. 
There are several aspects of this seriogram worth noting, The single- 
word strings at Positions 6 and 12 are notable in that this subject did not 
enlarge on either of these groups during his seven trials to criterion. The 
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FIG. 1. Illustrative seriogram. SL( F) is forward serial learning; FR is free recall; 
SL( B ) is backward serial learning. 
triangular group that runs from Position 14 to Position 18 is a group that 
is being enlarged by adding on preceding words. The two groups begin- 
ning at Positions 8 and 21 are developing by addition of succeeding 
words. 
The single column of dots under the designator FR is this subject’s free 
recall record. A dot at a given position means that that word was recalled. 
Dots connected by a line represent words recalled together in a group. 
(We will define these groups later. For now it suffices that they represent 
output clusters. ) The numbers to the right of these free-recall results 
indicate output order, with isolated dots and groups of connected dots 
(clusters) taken with parity. 
We will make several analyses of these free recall results later, but 
this is a convenient place to point out a particular phenomenon. Consider 
the words at Positions 21, 22, and 23 in the forward serial learning lat- 
tice in Fig. 1. They make up a Size 3 group. The word at Position 21 we 
call an F word because it is the first word in the group. The word at 
Position 20, the word that just precedes the group and was never 
anticipated correctly, we call an F - 1 word. When we look at this 
subject’s free-recall record we see that the F - 1 word was recalled, and 
that the F - 1 and F words were recalled together (output unit 8). If 
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we now look at the column labeled SL( B), the record of this subject’s 
first (and only) backward anticipation trial, we see that the F word, the 
one at Position 21, successfully elicited what in forward serial anticipation 
was its F - 1 word. A similar relational pattern between F - 1 and F 
words occurs at Position 7-8, 11-12, and 24-25. 
In Fig. 2 is the seriogram of another subject. He clearly learned the 
list in distinct subsequences of equal size. In free recall this subject 
produced all but one of the 32 words, neatly packaged in groups of four. 
But note that the output order of these groups is well-scrambled: The 
first group recalled was for Positions 14; the second was for Positions 
17-20; and so on. In a postexperimental interview, this subject produced 
eight unrelated sentences, each containing four successive words from 
the list. 
Note also in Fig. 2 the relation between F - 1 and F words discussed 
earlier for Fig. 1. At positions 17-18, 21-22, and 2930 the group-preced- 
ing F - 1 and group-leading-edge F words are produced adjacently in 
free recall, and in backward anticipation the F - 1 words are elicited 
by their affiliated F words. 
Seriograms can be stored on tape or on punched cards and printed out 
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FIG. 2. Illustrative seriogram. SL( F) is forward serial learning; FR is free recall; 
SL( B) is backward serial learning. 
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of interest. But they should be studied individually. One thing apparent 
from the study of individual seriograms is that there is clear subjective 
stibsequencing. Another thing is that the subsequences are largely idio- 
syncratic. Certainly there is commonality over subjects with respect to 
either end of the list, and there is a degree of agreement that certain 
adjacent words in our list go together naturally, like GLUE and SHOP 
in Positions 16 and 17 (the strongest instance), although the two subjects 
represented in Figs. 1 and 2 did not participate in this agreement nor 
did they agree with each other. 
Anticipation Errors 
A common event in learning a fixed sequence is what is called an 
anticipation error. Such an error occurs when a subject emits a word that 
is wrong for the current position in the sequence but is correct for a 
later position. Given that we can identify with reasonable accuracy an 
individual subject’s subjective subsequences, we can inquire into the 
typical source of such errors. For example, we may ask whether antici- 
pation errors come from later positions where responding is correct or 
incorrect. If from later correct positions, are these positions subsequence 
leading-edge positions or internal positions? In any event, the general 
subsuming question is whether or not these presumed subjective sub- 
sequences are nomothetically related to a well-known serial learning 
phenomenon, namely, anticipation errors. 
For this analysis we will define a subjective subsequence as a run of 
correct anticipations on the 21-out-of-32 criterion trial, and categorize 
anticipation errors on that trial according to the apparent subsequence 
structure at later positions. 
Altogether, over all 48 subjects, we observed 136 anticipation errors 
on the criterion trial such that each was identifiable with a later subjective 
subsequence of Size 2 or larger. By “identifiable” we mean that the 
anticipation error was either an F - 2, F - 1, F, F + 1, or L item in a 
later subsequence. An F item is the leading-edge word of the subsequence. 
An F - 1 item is the just-preceding word, a word not given as a correct 
response on the criterion trial. An F - 2 item is the word just before the 
F - 1 item, and may or may not have been correct on the criterion trial. 
An F + 1 item is the correctly anticipated word in the position just after 
the leading-edge F item. An L item is the last, or trailing-edge, word of 
the subsequence. It is identical to the F + 1 item in subsequences of 
Size 2. Thus each of the 136 anticipation errors was classifiable as to 
source, where “source” means F - 2, F - 1, F, F + 1, and L items of 
subsequences of Size 2 or larger later in the criterion trial. 
For each subsequence size separately we counted the number of times 
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FIG. 3. Observed and expected frequency of F - 2, F - 1, F, F + 1, and L words 
as anticipation errors. 
F - 2, F - 1, F, F + 1, . . . , and L items were correct anticipations on 
trials prior to the criterion trial. This yields an expectation distribution 
of sorts, a distribution that can be taken to index the availability of items 
for responding, The open-circles dashed-line curve in Fig. 3 shows how 
the 136 anticipation errors should be distributed over F - 2, F - 1, F, 
F + 1, and L sources according to this availability expectation. The filled- 
circles solid-line curve shows how anticipation errors were in fact 
distributed.4 The trends shown in Fig. 3 are typical of all subsequence 
sizes. 
As is evident, anticipation errors are primarily leading-edge F items 
from subjective subsequences later in the list. Items following F items in 
a subsequence are progressively less likely as anticipation errors, a trend 
exactly in reverse of their availability as inferred from prior correct 
responding. Finally, since later we will make much of the F - 1 items, 
we note that they are a minimal source of anticipation errors. 
A Definition of Subjective Subsequences 
The definition of a subjective subsequence used in the preceding section 
(a run of correct response on the criterion trial) is but one of a set of 
possible definitions. It was convenient for the intended purpose. Most 
alternative definitions yield the same subsequences, differing only to a 
minor degree in whether or not a given item will be included at one or 
the other end of a subsequence. Since in the intertask analyses to follow 
we attempt to characterize the serial learning subsequences in terms of 
4 Since for groups of Size 2 the F + 1 word is the L word, the expected and ob- 
served frequencies for Size-2 groups were repeated exactly as contributions to the 
F + 1 and L points in Fig. 3, as opposed to making some other adjustment for 
opportunity. 
SUBJECTIVE SUBSEQUENCES 429 
performance in the free recall and backward learning tasks, we settled 
on the following more stringent definition, which includes an item in a 
subsequence if it was produced with that subsequence either on the 
criterion trial or on two or more previous trials. We define {F, F + 1, . . . , 
L} as a subjective subsequence if the affiliated F - 1 item was never a 
correct anticipation and F, F + 1, . . . , L were adjacent correct antici- 
pations either on the 2I-out-of-32 criterion trial or on at least two preced- 
ing trials. This definition produced 213 subsequences over the 48 subjects. 
Of these, 67 were Size 1 (consisting of an F item only, bounded on either 
side by errors) and 146 were Size 2 or larger. 
Free Recall 
In Table 1 is shown the proportion of F - 2, F - 1, F, and F + 1 
items that were free recalled. The F - 2 items are those that precede 
the never-correctly-anticipated F - 1 items and, accordingly, are pre- 
sumably not identified with the subsequence {F, F + 1, . . . , L). For the 
67 Size-l subsequences, recallability of affiliated F - 1 items, leading- 
edge F items, and would-be “F + 1” items is inferior to the recallability 
of the corresponding items from the 146 subsequences of Size 2 and 
larger. The recallability of F - 1 items can be viewed in either of two 
ways: They are less available than their adjacent F items, or they are 
seemingly readily available in light of their (definitional) absence in 
forward serial learning. 
Organization in Free Recall 
The “reality” of the subsequences identified in the serial learning task 
can be indexed by what clusters with what in free recall, Consider first 
the combination of F - 2, F - 1, and F items. Of the 213 identified sub- 
sequences there were 135 where in free recall all three of these items were 
recalled. Taking only the 72 cases where the medial F - I item was re- 
called adjacently to either its F - 2 item or its F item but not both, it 
clustered with the F item 63 times and with the F - 2 item only 9 times. 
TABLE 1 
Proportion Free Recall of Items AfFiliated with Subsequences Identified 
in Serial Learning 
Item 
Subsequence 
size N F-2 F-l F F+l 
1 67 .84 .67 .80 .7B 
>l 146 .84 .81 .92 .!I4 
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Thus given that the never-correctly-anticipated F - 1 item clustered 
with either F - 2 or F in free recall, it clustered with F 87.5% of the time. 
The 6319 ratio for all 72 cases breaks down to 19/l and 4418 for Size-l 
and Size-e-and-larger subsequences, respectively. 
Consider now the same analysis one step to the right. Of the 213 sub- 
sequences identified in serial learning, 138 involved joint recall of F - 1, 
F, and F + 1 items. For the 31 cases involving Size-l subsequences F + 1 
is the item that would belong to the subsequence if the subsequence were 
Size 2 or larger. Of the 31 cases, there were 20 in which the F item 
clustered either with its F - 1 item or its would-be F + 1 item but not 
both. The observed ratio is 20/O. Thus the isolated F item clustered only 
with its affiliated F - 1 item. Of the 107 cases where the subsequence 
was Size 2 or larger, there were 51 cases where the F item clustered with 
only one or the other of the F - 1 and F + 1 items. Here the ratio is 
29/22, indicating an indifference between F affinities for F - 1 and 
F + 1 items. 
The foregoing analyses indicate that never-correctly-anticipated F - 1 
items (errors in serial learning) are closely integrated with the subjective 
subsequences they precede, a fact that agrees with the high incidence of 
errors at serial positions that initiate an experimenter-imposed sub- 
sequence ( e.g., Restle, 1970). 
We will report one additional fact from the free recall protocols that 
helps to clarify the structural relation between F - 1 items and the sub- 
sequences with which they are affiliated. This fact has to do with the 
order of recall within an observed cluster. When F - 1 and F items occur 
together in a recall cluster, the proportion of them where the output order 
is F - 1 += F is .78. Thus the backward order F + F - 1 occurred only 
22% of the time. The 78% forward order for F - 1 + F compares favorably 
with the 84% forward order for F + F + 1 in recall clusters containing 
those items. The implication here is that not only are the never-correctly- 
anticipated F - 1 items closely related to their adjacent subjective sub- 
sequences, they also appear to be sequentially constrained. 
Within- Versus Between-Group Output Order 
Looking again at the seriogram in Fig. 2, we see eight identifiable 
groups. We see also that they are recalled in a scrambled order. We can 
certainly index the degree of agreement between the list order of these 
groups and their output order in free recall. Similarly, at a lower level 
of representation, we can index the degree of agreement between the list 
order of items within a group and their output order. 
In this analysis, the definition of a group in free recall must be more 
subjective than was our earlier definition of a subsequence in forward 
SUBJECTIVE SUBSEQUENCES 431 
serial learning. For example, consider in Fig. 2 the second cluster in free 
recall, the group of four words in Positions 17 through 20. The order 
of recall of these four words was Position 18 first, then Position 17, then 
Position 19, and finally Position 20. There is no question that this is a 
subjective group in recall-whereas this group was second in output 
order, its neighbors from the original list were fourth and seventh in out- 
put order. Thus a strict adjacency criterion was not used in identifying 
recall groups. We feel, however, that our intuitions would prove de- 
fensible against all charges. 
For each of the 48 subjects we calculated a Kendall’s tau correlation 
coefficient for each of his recall groups of Size 2 and larger, where what 
was correlated is output order and list order. Thus, for example, the 
seriogram in Fig. 2 yielded eight such taus. Once done, we then calculated 
a single between-groups tau for each subject using the groups themselves 
as units. We then did two things. First, we determined for each subject 
whether the groups-ordering tau was less than, the same as, or greater 
than the median of his several within-group taus. The result, over 48 
subjects, was that 77% were less than, 6% were the same as, and 17% were 
greater than. Second, we calculated a composite within-group tau for 
each subject, which means that for each subject we added up the 
numerators for his several within-group taus, then the denominators, and 
finally divided the denominator total into the numerator total. For each 
subject we then compared the groups-ordering tau with the resulting 
composite within-group tau. What we found was that the groups-ordering 
tau was smaller for 83% of the subjects, the same for 2%, and greater for 
15%. (The first way weights all groups equally, regardless of size. The 
second way weights groups in direct proportion to their size. ) 
The result of this analysis is clear: Within-group recall order was in 
greater agreement with the serial order of the list than was the recall 
order of groups as groups. Acquisition of sequence knowledge appears 
to proceed from that internal to subjective subsequences to that of order- 
ing the subsequences themselves. 
Backward Anticipation 
We will restrict consideration of performance in the backward serial 
learning task to what happens in the region of what in forward serial 
learning were the leading edges of subjective subsequences. The salient 
fact is that on seeing F items in the backward task, the proportion cm- 
rect elicitations of the F - 1 items is .67, a fact in clear contrast to the 
absence of correct forward anticipation of F - 1 in the original forward 
task. With respect to subjective subsequences of Size 2 and larger, if we 
conditionalize the backward F + F - 1 transition probability on whether 
432 MARTIN AND NOREEN 
or not F was itself correctly elicited by F + 1, the respective values are 
.65 and .68, based on 108 and 38 observations. Moreover, with respect 
to subjective subsequences of Size 1, where there is no F + 1 item, the 
backward F + F - 1 transition probability is .69, based on 67 observa- 
tions. Thus the relation between F - 1 and F items does not depend on 
the size of the subjective sequence nor does it depend on whether or not 
the link between F and F + 1 in Size 2 or larger groups is of sufficient 
strength for the backward F + 1 + F transition. 
That the foregoing conclusion is not vacuous can be demonstrated as 
follows. A subjective subsequence of Size 2 or larger involves, by defi- 
nition, a never-correctly-anticipated F - 1 item followed by F and F + 1 
items. One of the backward anticipation phenomena reported above is that 
when F + 1 correctly elicits F, then F correctly elicits F - 1 with 
probability .65. Now consider all subjective subsequences such that in 
addition to F - 1, F - 2 was also never correct in forward serial learn- 
ing. Of these, there were 37 cases where in the backward task F correctly 
elicited F - 1. Here, however, the probability of the backward F - 1+ 
F - 2 transition is only .24 (9 out of 37). Thus the backward elicitation 
capacity extends to F - 1 items but not to F - 2 items. This result joins 
the clustering result in arguing for the F - 1 item as an integral part of 
a subjective subsequence. 
DISCUSSION 
What we take our analyses to reveal may be summarized as follows: 
When faced with learning a structurally homogeneous sequence, sub- 
jects develop idiosyncratic subsequences that are easily identifiable and 
that sensibly relate to such other phenomena as anticipation errors during 
acquisition and clustering in later free recall. Moreover, certain errors 
in serial learning are clearly integrated members of the subsequences they 
precede. What this adds up to is repudiation of continuous-process theories 
of serial learning. Thus the following comments by Bower (1970, p. 41) 
are as cogent to the ordinary serial learning situation as to other areas of 
memory research: 
The first general idea is that a preferred strategy of the adult human in 
learning a large body of material is to “divide and conquer”; that is, sub- 
divide the material into smaller groups by some means, and then learn 
these parts as integrated packets of information. . . . The advantage of a 
simple grouping strategy is that the operation can be applied recursively, 
aggregating together chunks and then groups of chunks into an organized 
hierarchy. 
This also was Mandler’s (1967) point. The conclusion of the present 
writers is that the same principles of subjective organization apply to the 
SUBJECTIVE SUBSEQUENCES 433 
traditional serial learning paradigm and therefore that speculation on 
how serial learning works should be subsumed under an organizational 
approach. 
Regarding specific continuous-mechanism theories, Restle and Brown 
( 1970) rejected the associative chaining theory of serial learning on the 
grounds that it could not handle learning of the branching sequences 
they used. We further reject it here on the grounds that even with non- 
branching sequences it cannot explain the distinctive subsequencing 
observed in individual seriograms. Restle and Brown rejected the serial 
position (locational) hypothesis because group-average error profiles over 
serial positions are jagged in a way that agrees with a priori structural 
heterogeneity. We concur in this rejection, adding that if jagged serial 
position curves cannot be found by looking at group averages, they can 
be found by examining individual seriograms. 
There are three likely objections to the bases of our conclusions. One 
is that in our experiment the subjects could pace themselves through 
the list in any way they saw fit, thus providing opportunity for subjective 
subsequencing that might not obtain in an experimenter-paced task. We 
cannot at present reject this possibility directly. We can, though, point 
out that in Simpson’s (1965) study, where approximation to English word 
order was varied, anticipation learning was paced at a 2-set rate, yet the 
effects of implicit grammatical structure showed clearly. Similarly, rigid 
pacing does not obscure subsequence effects in learning rule-generated 
lists (Restle & Brown, 1970). Thus in situations where a priori structure 
can be assumed, pacing does not prevent utilization of that structure. 
Moreover, in free-recall learning experiments where subjective organi- 
zation emerges over trials, list presentation is typically paced, sometimes 
at a rate as fast as 1 set per item (Tulving, 1962). What these various 
results mean to us is that forced pacing in serial anticipation learning 
probably does not preclude subjective subsequencing. 
The second likely objection is that we stopped our subjects short of 
perfect performance and based our identification of subjective sub- 
sequences largely on what we observed on the final trial, thus raising the 
possibility that some undetermined number of these subsequences are 
chance vents. In response we assert that not many of these identifications 
can be a mistake because (a) except for items at either end of a sub- 
sequence, a given subsequence is highly predictable from what is observ- 
able on the preceding trial, and (b) the subsequences so identified are 
strongly related to performance characteristics in free recall and in back- 
ward anticipation learning and to the source of anticipation errors during 
learning. 
The final likely objection we shall treat is that having stopped our 
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subjects at a subperfect stage of learning, we cannot know that the sub- 
jects’ terminal knowledge of the sequence at complete mastery would 
in any way involve subjective subsequences. Against this possibility we 
can report that when the sequence contains arbitrary, experimenter- 
imposed structure and learning is taken to a criterion of perfect perfor- 
mance, it is true that in ordinary leisurely free recall the subjects re- 
produce the list in essentially perfect serial order, but in free recall under 
speed stress the output order falls apart so that order of recall of the 
arbitrary subsequences follows a bowed serial position function (Martin, 
in press). Similarly, McLean and Gregg ( 1967) report that interresponse 
times in serial recall faithfully reflect subsequence organization during 
learning, even when serial recall is perfectly ordered. Lesgold and Bower 
( 1970) have shown that after complete mastery of a subgrouped sequence, 
progress in a paired-associate task is heterogeneous according to whether 
the pairs do or do not span a group boundary. In other words, we have 
no reason to believe that subsequences clearly present at premastery 
stages of learning disappear upon mastery. 
Contemplation of subjective structures in serial learning is not an 
activity that induces theoretical satisfaction. It is true that hierarchical 
representations appear useful and attractive (Johnson, 1970; Lesgold & 
Bower, 1970; Restle, 1970; Egan, 1973), particularly on the proviso 
that the theorist has an a priori idea as to what the effective structure 
might be. In the case of serial learning of a homogeneous sequence, 
subjects not only make up their own subsequences, they also enlarge 
them from trial to trial, sometimes by addition of items on the front end 
of a subsequence, sometimes by addition on the back end. Thus sub- 
sequence size as well as boundary location must be random variables 
at the outset, and both must change probabilistically over learning trials. 
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